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A particular kind of wonder: 





Wonder may be an important emotion, but the term ‘wonder’ is remarkably 
ambiguous. For centuries, in psychological discourse, it has been defined as a variety 
of things. In an attempt to be more focused, and given the growing scientific interest 
in magic, this article describes a particular kind of wonder: the response to a magic 
trick. It first provides a historical perspective by considering continuity and change 
over time in this experience, and argues that, in certain respects, this particular kind of 
wonder has changed. It then describes in detail the experience of magic, considers the 
extent to which it might be considered acquired rather than innate, and how it relates 
to other emotions, such as surprise. In the process, it discusses the role of belief, and 
offers some suggestions for future research. It concludes by noting the importance of 
context and meaning in shaping the nature of the experience, and argues for the value 









Richard Dawkins (1998) has described ‘wonder’ as the origin of scientific enquiry, 
and Robert Fuller (2006) has claimed that ‘wonder’ is a principal source of 
spirituality. In doing so, the latter refers to Socrates’ and Descartes’ oft-cited 
descriptions of ‘wonder’ as, respectively, the beginning of philosophy and the first of 
the passions (Fuller, 2006, 1, 9). If ‘wonder’ is indeed the source of science and 
religion, thinking and feeling, then no wonder that Jesse Prinz has suggested it might 
be humanity’s most important emotion (Prinz, 2013).  
 
However, when we speak of ‘wonder’, we speak of many things. We can wonder at 
the beauty of a sunset, or wonder why the train is late. We can experience awe, 
dismay, admiration, surprise or curiosity, and we can think of them all as kinds of 
‘wonder’. Socrates’ ‘wonder’ (translated from ‘thaumazein’) was bewilderment 
provoked by seemingly impossible contradictions, followed by curiosity (Plato, 1921, 
p. 155). On the other hand, Descartes’ ‘wonder’ (translated from ‘admiration’), was 
the response to a novel or unexpected object, which is dispelled by curiosity 
(Descartes, 1989, p. 52; Descartes, 2001, p. 263). And, since the emergence of the 
modern view of ‘emotion’, ‘wonder’ has been defined in various ways, depending on 
how scholars have viewed the emotions.  
 
When Thomas Brown distinguished between ‘astonishment’ and ‘wonder’, this was 
part of his larger attempt to separate emotion from thought (Brown, 1820, pp. 303-5). 
Charles Bell made a similar distinction, but did so using different definitions, based 
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on his view that emotions should be distinguished according to facial expressions 
(Bell, 1806, pp. 142-3). Darwin took such an approach, but noted that the facial 
expression of ‘astonishment’ was occasionally recognized as terror, horror, woe, pain 
or disgust (Darwin, 1872, p. 279). Meanwhile, Alexander Bain, who distinguished 
between the emotions using both physical and mental criteria, described 
‘astonishment’ (which he equated with ‘wonder’) in significantly more positive terms, 
regarding its characteristic feature as ‘an elation of tone’ (Bain, 1865, 45-7). 
 
Psychologists continued to define wonder in a variety of ways and, in doing so, 
placed it in different relationships to surprise, awe and curiosity. For example, 
Mercier (1888) placed wonder in one category and the latter three in another (pp. 352-
3, 361). McDougall (1908), on the other hand, defined wonder as a primary emotion 
that accompanied the instinct of curiosity. More recently, wonder has been defined in 
a similar way to ‘surprise’ (i.e. as a response to the unexpected) (Frijda, 1986), and 
has been discussed in the sense of ‘awe’ (Haidt & Keltner, 2004). In this latter sense, 
its status as an emotion has been questioned (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1986, pp. 129-36). 
On the other hand, Ekman & Cordora (2011), who define ‘wonder’ in contrast with 
‘awe’, expect that wonder is an emotion for which evidence of universality will be 
found. 
 
The variety of definitions of ‘wonder’ is one example of how we have defined the 
emotions in different ways, in line with particular assumptions about psychological 
phenomena (Averill, 1990; Dixon, 2003; Gergen, 1995; Russell, 2012). In the process 
of using different definitions, we have been discussing different things (Danziger, 
1997; Leary, 1990). If, on the other hand, we treat emotions as responses to particular 
A particular kind of wonder 
 4 
situations, then we might benefit from examining responses to particular causes of 
‘wonder’ (cf. Harre, 1986; Harre and Parrot, 1996; Kagan, 2010). With this in mind, 
this article examines what might be considered to be a particular kind of wonder. 
 
The particular kind of wonder in question is the response to a magic trick. In addition 
to being both historically and culturally ubiquitous (Clarke, 1983; Kirby, 1974; 
Taylor, 1985), magic tricks are amenable to experimental enquiry. Indeed, they are 
particularly topical, given recent interest in a ‘science of magic’. While psychologists 
have studied magic for over a century, interest has risen significantly in recent years, 
with a growing number of experimental studies attempting to provide a more 
scientific understanding of magic, and exploiting conjuring techniques in order to 
examine more general psychological processes (for summaries of this recent work, 
see: Kuhn, Olson & Raz, 2016; Rensink & Kuhn, 2015a; Thomas, Didierjean, 
Maquestiaux & Gygax, 2015). In the process, while there has been disagreement over 
the value of constructing a scientific theory of magic, nobody has doubted the 
potential of magic being used to shed light on psychological processes (Kuhn, Amlani 
& Rensink, 2008; Lamont, 2015; Lamont & Henderson, 2010; Rensink & Kuhn, 
2015b). Some have examined responses to magic tricks in an attempt to identify 
neural correlates of the experience of magic (Danek, Fraps, Müller, Grothe & 
Öllinger, 2014; Parris, Kuhn, Mizon, Benattayallah & Hodgson, 2009), or to 
understand the phenomenology of discovering how a magic trick is done (Danek, 
Öllinger, Fraps, Grothe & Flanagin, 2015). Indeed, the ‘experience of wonder’ now 
appears to be the central focus of a ‘science of magic’ (Rensink & Kuhn, 2015a).  
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This then begs the question: what is this experience? After all, ‘wonder’ can be many 
things. This article, then, examines this particular kind of wonder. It begins by 
providing a brief historical perspective of how magic has been viewed, and considers 
continuity and change in the experience over time. It then describes the experience of 
magic in detail, considers the extent to which it might be considered acquired rather 
than innate, and how it relates to other emotions, such as ‘surprise’. In doing so, it 
discusses the role of belief, and offers some suggestions for future research.  
 
 
Continuity and change in the experience of magic 
 
The fact that psychological thinkers have defined ‘wonder’ in a variety of ways is not 
surprising to historians. Historians of emotion have described various changes in the 
meanings of emotion words, and in norms of emotional behavior. In doing so, they 
have revealed how our understanding of certain feelings is bound up with the wider 
social context, which shapes not only the meanings of the words we use, but also what 
counts as an appropriate expression of a particular feeling at any given time. 
‘Emotionologies’ (Stearns and Stearns, 1988) may change, and this may encourage 
(or discourage) particular kinds of emotional displays. In the process, the frequency, 
duration and, perhaps, the valence of certain emotions may be affected. The same 
might be said to be the case within different ‘emotional regimes’ (Reddy, 2001) or 
‘emotional communities’ (Rosenwein, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, to what extent we can say that emotions change over time remains a 
problematic question. Emotion terms may come and go, but the feelings they describe 
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may not. Acedia, once a familiar condition, may be (by definition) different from 
‘depression’ (LaMothe, 2007), but the feeling (as described in the past) has not 
necessarily gone away (MacQuarrie, 2013). In certain times and places, anger may 
have become more restrained (Stearns and Stearns, 1986), shame may have been (to 
some extent) replaced with guilt (Demos, 1988), and grief may have become more 
private (Stearns & Knapp, 1996). Over time, such emotions might be described 
differently, regarded by contemporaries as more or less desirable, and displayed in a 
variety of forms. However, historians have naturally struggled to access the subjective 
experience at the heart of the matter. 
 
In the case of wonder, for example, Daston and Park (1998) have shown how the 
meaning of ‘wonder’ and ‘curiosity’ changed over time. Between the medieval period 
and the mid-eighteenth century, scholars wrote of these in a variety of ways, as part of 
wider moral, religious, philosophical and scientific debates. Within this complex 
process, however, Daston and Park identify a general shift in the meaning of the two 
terms, as wonder became considered increasingly vulgar, and curiosity became 
increasingly revered. Their work focuses on scholarly texts, which do not necessarily 
reflect wider views, but so far as it reflects a shift in understanding, this might be seen 
as a change in ‘wonder’, or it might be seen as a shift in preference for one kind of 
wonder rather than another. However, this would presumably depend on what, 
precisely, people were wondering at, and what they were being curious about. After 
all, in these scholarly texts, the status of either feeling was linked to particular objects 
of wonder and curiosity.  
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Historians have also examined a wide variety of objects of wonder. These include 
monsters and panoramas, automata and the occult, cabinets of curiosities and tales of 
foreign travel (Benedict, 2001; Bynum, 1997; Evans & Marr, 2006; Fisher, 1998; 
Fuller, 2006; Greenblatt, 1991; Stafford, 1994). These have been discussed as objects 
of ’wonder’ by treating ‘wonder’ in the broadest sense, allowing all manner of 
experiences to be considered, whether in the context of entertainment, art, science or 
spirituality. This is admirably inclusive, but it does have implications when we try to 
say something meaningful about the experience of ‘wonder’. Indeed, as Evans and 
Marr (2006) point out, some scholars have regarded ambiguity as a defining feature of 
wonder (p. 2). This, perhaps, is not surprising, if wonder is defined in such a broad 
way. If wonder is so many things, then we might say so many things about it. 
However, an examination of particular objects of wonder, such as magic tricks, allows 
for a more focused analysis of particular experiences.  
 
As it happens, both Augustine and Roger Bacon wrote briefly about magic tricks. 
This matters because these two scholars are examples of the shifting meanings of the 
terms ‘wonder’ and ‘curiosity’. For Augustine, wonder was a positive feeling, while 
curiosity was vulgar and aimless. Bacon, on the other hand, associated wonder with 
ignorance: it was, for him, a lack of curiosity, which hampered enquiry by dulling the 
senses (Daston & Park, 1998, p. 112). In other words, they represent a shift in the 
relative status of wonder and curiosity. If we look at what they wrote about magic 
tricks, however, we see greater continuity. For Augustine, magic tricks were a 
curiosity, in which people delight in the trickery, and in this fascination with 
deception, they are distracted from the truth (Taillefer, 2015, p. 85). For Bacon, magic 
tricks provoked wonder by using deception to disguise reality (Bacon, 1923, p. 15). 
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For both, magic tricks were forms of deceit, which prevented the observer from 
seeing things as they really were. In short, what Augustine regarded as a distracting 
curiosity was, for Bacon, a distracting wonder. While they may have had different 
views about the general value of wonder versus curiosity, they shared a similar view 
of the particular feeling provoked by magic tricks.  
 
Indeed, in terms of these particular objects of wonder, there has been a longstanding 
continuity in how the feeling that they provoke has been understood. The earliest 
known references, which appear in ancient Greece, suggest an understanding that 
magic tricks provoked the experience of a seemingly impossible event, but one that 
relied on trickery. For example, both Plato and Seneca the Younger compared a magic 
trick to a paradox, which relied on deception (Plato, 1921, p. 331; Seneca, 1917, p. 
295), and Alciphron described how a fictional rustic, Napeus, was made ‘almost 
speechless with astonishment’ by a trick that he (Napeus) assumed was based on 
sleight of hand (Alciphron, 1949, pp. 111-12). They viewed magic tricks, as 
Augustine and Bacon did, as a form of deception, an awareness that can be found 
throughout the early modern period (Lamont, 2017). In other words, whatever other 
kinds of wonders may have been considered real at any given time, there has been a 
longstanding frame through which our pre- and early modern ancestors have been 
able to experience magic tricks as seemingly impossible illusions. 
 
In the nineteenth century, this view was a common theme in the discourse of ‘modern 
magic’ (During, 2002), which attracted the attention of early psychologists, such as 
Jastrow, Dessoir and Binet (Hyman, 1989). Their interest in magic was as a form of 
deception, and part of a more general ‘psychology of error’ within early scientific 
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psychology, in which, by providing psychological explanations for why people held 
erroneous beliefs, they were able to demonstrate the value of scientific Psychology 
(Lamont, 2013, p. 181ff.). In the process, they attempted to translate what magicians 
had written into psychological terminology, and conducted some experiments with 
magicians that purported to provide greater understanding of how magic worked 
(Binet, 1894; Dessoir, 1893; Jastrow, 1896, 1897; Triplett, 1900). The emotional 
reaction to magic tricks, which was not in line with their wider aims, was not of 
particular interest. 
 
However, so far as they described the experience of magic, it was as the product of 
the conjuror directing the thoughts of the audience, so that the latter experienced an 
effect that they knew to be impossible, yet understood was not real. It resulted, in the 
words of Dessoir (1893), ‘from this logical contradiction of two simultaneous ideas’, 
which he called the ‘consciousness of illusion’ (p. 16). Binet (1894) called it 
‘astonishment’ (p. 557) and Jastrow (1897) called it ‘bewilderment’ (p. 851). While 
they used different labels, however, they defined the experience in similar ways to 
their ancestors and, of course, in a way that is familiar to us today (i.e. as a response 
to an event that we consider impossible, though we understand it to be an illusion). In 
other words, the labels may have changed, and other objects of wonder may have 
provoked different feelings, but this particular view of this kind of wonder seems to 
have been around for a very long time.  
  
Nevertheless, one can identify certain changes over time in terms of the nature of the 
experience. After all, since it depends on the event seeming impossible, despite being 
viewed as an illusion, it involves the observer considering - as s/he is observing the 
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trick - how it might be done. Thus, the experience is intrinsically bound up with 
whatever possibilities are in the mind of the observer. These have varied in different 
contexts, of course, but there are at least two general ways in which the response to 
magic tricks might be seen to have changed over time, in terms of what has been in 
the mind of observers as they watch. 
 
First, there has been a significant increase in the possible methods that can be 
considered. Since the late sixteenth century, books have been published that reveal 
how magic tricks are done (e.g. Scot, 1584; Prevost, 1584/1988; R[id], 1612). These 
increased in quantity in the eighteenth century, and significantly in both quantity and 
quality in the nineteenth century (Scott, 1976). By then, popular magic books were 
including sufficiently detailed descriptions and illustrations for a lay reader to 
recognize the use of such methods (Hoffman, 1876; Sachs, 1877, Hopkins, 1898). The 
public was made increasingly aware that things might secretly go up sleeves or down 
trapdoors, be suspended from wires or concealed by mirrors. The trend continued 
throughout the twentieth century, as methods were increasingly exposed on television 
and, later, the internet. Regardless of whether or not they were correct, audiences 
could now, as they were watching a magic trick, imagine a greater number of hidden 
possibilities.  
 
Second, the experience has increasingly involved the awareness that not only one’s 
eyes but also one’s thoughts are being manipulated. Before the nineteenth century, 
magicians were described, almost without exception, as performing their feats via 
sleight of hand. They were known as ‘jugglers’, whose hands were ‘quicker than the 
eye’, the manual basis of conjuring being assumed in the term ‘legerdemain’, and 
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later reinforced in the early nineteenth century term ‘prestidigitateur’ (Clarke, 1983, 
p. 123). By the early nineteenth century, no more had been revealed about how 
conjurors camouflaged their methods than that they used fast movements and trite 
patter to distract the attention of the audience (Beckmann, 1814, p. 264; Dean, 1817; 
Pinchbeck, 1805, p. 58). For those who watched magic with this in mind, the 
experience would have been one of knowing that the magician was doing something 
with his hands, but not being able to see what it was.  
 
This view, of course, has not gone away. However, a more intimate experience 
became possible during the nineteenth century, as magic tricks were increasingly 
revealed to be about diverting the mind as well as the eye. In best-selling books by 
magicians, and in scientific and popular articles by psychologists, the public were 
informed that the experience of magic was the result of controlling not only where the 
audience looked, but also what they thought was going on at any given moment. 
Magic, it was now revealed, depended less on the concealment of rapid movements 
than on the misdirection of minds (Dessoir, 1893, p. 15; Hoffmann, 1876, pp. 3-5, 
505; Jastrow, 1897, p. 851; Robert-Houdin, 1878, p. 33-35; Sachs, 1877, p. 40; 
Triplett, 1900, p. 487). This emerging ‘psychological’ view of the experience of 
magic was accompanied by a remarkable rise in the popularity of mindreading as 
entertainment, not to mention the deliberately public debunking of ‘psychic’ 
mindreading by scientific psychologists (Coon 1992; Lamont, 2013; Luckhurst, 
2002). In their constant attempts to boost box-office, every significant stage conjuror 
of this period included mind-reading tricks as part of their show (Clarke, 1983). In the 
process, the Victorian public was able to experience magic in a more intimate way: as 
A particular kind of wonder 
 12 
a process that involved an awareness that not only their eyes, but also their thoughts, 
were being manipulated.  
 
Since then, the psychological nature of magic has become increasingly explicit, with 
more psychologists writing on the topic, a significant rise of ‘mentalists’ who perform 
mind-reading and ‘psychological illusions’, and a continuing growth in the exposure 
of methods that has led to magic increasingly being performed on the assumption that 
the audience suspects particular methods might be in play (Lamont and Wiseman, 
1999). We continue to experience a kind of wonder, in response to a seemingly 
impossible event that we understand to be an illusion, but the process through which 
this is achieved now involves a greater number of possibilities going through our 
heads, and a greater awareness that the magician is attempting to misdirect not only 
our eyes, but also our thoughts. In the case of prolonged effects, such as levitations, 
this awareness may be present as the magical effect itself (i.e. the moment of seeming 
impossibility) is taking place.1 In that sense, one might say that the experience of 
magic is not quite the same as it used to be.  
                                                        
1 A classic example, which would come to exemplify how conjurors misdirected their 
audiences, is Robert-Houdin’s ‘ethereal suspension’, in which he suspended his son in the air, 
and claimed that this was due to the mysterious powers of ether. While some of the audience 
might have actually believed this, contemporary reviews, when they referred to ether, were 
often accompanied by skeptical remarks (Fechner, 2003, I, pp. 394-6; “The Drama”, 1848; 
“Robert Houdin’s Soirees Fantastiques”, 1848). Those who viewed this as an illusion, rather 
than as the result of ether, had to consider the ether ‘explanation’, and then reject it. In doing 
so, they would have been aware that the conjuror was attempting to mislead their thoughts 
(which, of course, is precisely what he was attempting to do). An awareness of this, along 




Understanding the experience of magic 
 
The response to a magic trick is the response to a seemingly impossible event. It is an 
event that, on the one hand, one considers to be impossible but, on the other hand, one 
is convinced takes place. It is this juxtaposition between ‘x cannot happen’ and ‘x 
happens’ that provokes the experience of magic (Lamont, 2013, p. 44). At the same 
time, however, this experience is understood to be an illusion. Since at least ancient 
Greece, and throughout the early modern period, whatever magical beliefs might have 
been available, audiences have been able to experience a magic trick as an illusion. 
Like the emotions one feels when watching a movie (or, one might say, participating 
in a psychology experiment), it is experienced in a context that one knows to be 
artificial. The experience of magic, then, is a response to an event that: a. one is 
convinced cannot happen; b. one is convinced does happen; c. one understands to be 
an illusion. It is, then, a particular emotional experience that is bound up with certain 
beliefs. How might it be understood? 
 
First, the experience depends on learned beliefs about what is possible. There is, of 
course, some evidence that young infants can distinguish between ‘impossible’ and 
‘possible’ events. In their well-known ‘violation of expectation’ experiments, for 
example, Baillargeon and colleagues used visual stimuli, which they described as 
‘possible’ and ‘impossible’, and which appeared to show that 5-month-old infants 
                                                                                                                                                              
with a consideration of other ways in which it might be done, would have been present as 
they were observing the boy (seemingly) suspended in the air. 
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already recognize the difference between the two (Baillargeon, 1993). However, what 
appeared to be ‘impossible’ to the experimenters was not necessarily ‘impossible’ to 
the infants. Some have argued that they may have been responding to the novelty of 
the sequence of events, rather than to a violation of a physical principle (Borgatz, 
2000; Haith, 1998). Other evidence suggests that infants’ responses to such events can 
vary. According to Camras et al (2002), for example, when faced with novel, 
unexpected or impossible events, 11-month-old infants do not consistently display 
prototypical facial expressions of surprise. Such findings suggest an early emergence 
of the ability to recognize ‘impossible’ events, but not necessarily that it is innate.  
 
Furthermore, while there may be some ‘core knowledge’ about the physical world 
prior to learning (Stahl & Feigenson, 2015), the experience of magic depends on 
beliefs about the properties of particular things in particular contexts. At any age, the 
line between possible and impossible is far from self-evident, when applied to events 
concerning specific objects in particular conditions (Harris, 1994; Lamont, 2013; 
Phelps and Woolley, 1994; Subbotsky, 2001; Subbotsky, 2004; Wiseman, Greening 
& Smith, 2003). After all, we do not react to a balloon floating in the air as we do to a 
person floating in the air, because we understand that the former is possible, and that 
the latter is not. We do not react in the same way to everything that transforms, 
appears and disappears: we understand that ice cubes melt, and that lights can be 
switched on and off. We understand that most solid objects cannot penetrate other 
solid objects, even if some can (such as a dart in a dartboard, or a hot knife through 
butter). We understand that certain objects in certain circumstances cannot float in the 
air, even though some can (such as a hovercraft, or an astronaut in zero gravity). 
Thus, while the capacity to experience ‘impossible’ events may be innate, the 
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particular beliefs, on which the experience of magic depends, need to be learned.  
 
Second, the experience is not adequately described as ‘surprise’. Throughout the 
literature, ‘surprise’ is defined as a response to a violation of expectation. This 
unexpectedness is seen as fundamental to the structure and function of the emotional 
experience (e.g. Lorini & Castelfranchi, 2006; Meyer, Reisenzein & Schützwohl, 
1997; Ortony & Partridge, 1987). However, there are different kinds of 
unexpectedness. Scherer et al (2004), for example, suggested a distinction between 
‘surprise’ and ‘stupefaction’. The authors argued that, while ‘surprise’ involves an 
appraisal of a discrepancy based on a set of expectations, ‘stupefaction’ is a response 
to something beyond ‘any established or imaginable set of expectations, and in which 
there are no schemata available for appraisal’ (p. 400). ‘Stupefaction’ might be seen 
as a response to an exceptionally ‘novel’ or ‘unexpected’ event. However, by 
definition, it is not a response to a violation of existing schemata.  
 
The experience of magic is a response to a violation of existing schemata, but it is not 
a straightforward case of a violation of expectation. Indeed, as it happens, there is 
evidence from neuro-imaging of a difference between responses to unexpected events 
and responses to magic tricks (Danek et al, 2014; Parris et al, 2009). However, the 
very idea that there is a difference between responses to surprising and seemingly 
impossible events may seem, well, surprising. After all, if an event is considered 
impossible, then it should be a violation of expectation. Nevertheless, in important 
respects, the magical experience that occurs is not unexpected.  
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For one thing, it typically occurs in a context in which one expects to see something 
that is seemingly impossible. Furthermore, the audience often anticipates the 
particular magical effect that occurs. Magic effects are very often predictable: when a 
card is chosen, it is expected that the magician will find it; when a box is shown 
empty, it is anticipated that something will shortly appear inside it; when a rope is cut 
in two, one can confidently predict that it will be restored to one piece. It is essential 
for the magician to convey relevant information about the conditions - ‘there is no 
way the card can be known’, ‘the box is definitely empty’, ‘the rope is in two pieces’ - 
in order for the subsequent effect to be regarded as impossible. In doing so, the 
audience may anticipate the effect, yet nevertheless be astonished by it happening. 
Indeed, according to conjuring theory, the effect that occurs is regularly expected 
(Ortiz, 1994, p. 183). What matters is that, however predictable the effect, it is 
nevertheless regarded as impossible in the circumstances. 
 
How, then, can one expect an event to happen, while simultaneously believing it to be 
impossible? One answer would be to appeal to the notion of a ‘willing suspension of 
disbelief’ (e.g. During, 2002). After all, magic tricks typically take place in some kind 
of theatrical or entertainment context, and such a context is also associated with a 
‘willing suspension of disbelief’, in which an audience watches a theatrical 
performance while temporarily believing in the characters and plot. While this may be 
true for theatre, however, it is not the case for magic. On the contrary, a willing 
suspension of disbelief would ruin the experience of magic (Lamont, 2013, pp. 44-46; 
Ortiz, 1994, pp. 25-6; Swiss, 2002, p. 21). To take a classic example, if Peter Pan flies 
above the stage, and you ignore the wires, then that is a willing suspension of 
disbelief. If David Copperfield flies above the stage, however, then you do not ignore 
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the wires. You look for the wires, but do not see any: that is magic. Unless the 
possibility of wires is excluded, the effect fails, which is precisely why a hoop is 
invariably passed around the floating person. The experience of magic depends on the 
belief then and there (not willingly suspended disbelief, but real-time conviction) that 
the effect cannot happen.  
 
Recently, Leddington (2016) has also rejected the view that the experience of magic 
involves a ‘willing suspension of disbelief’. He has proposed instead that the 
experience is a ‘belief-discordant alief that an impossible event is happening’. His 
view that there is a conflict between an alief and a belief is based on rejecting the 
view that magic involves a conflict of beliefs. As he notes, audiences do not both 
believe and disbelieve that David Copperfield is flying (p. 257). However, the conflict 
of beliefs is not between ‘he is flying’ and ‘he is not’; rather, it is a conflict between 
the belief that ‘he is in the air’ and the belief that ‘he has no support’. The appearance 
that he is ‘flying’ may be understood to be an illusion, but there is observable 
evidence that ‘he is in the air’ yet ‘he has no support’, which seems impossible.  
 
There is, then, an alternative way to understand the conflict of beliefs, and of 
expectations. The expectation that the effect will happen is based on the belief that 
one is observing an illusion. Thus, since it is not really happening, it is not really 
impossible; indeed, it is the whole point of the performance. Nevertheless, the 
experience depends on the belief that something seemingly impossible does happen. It 
does not depend on the belief that an object really ‘disappears’ (or ‘transforms’ into 
something else). It depends on the conviction that the object is now there, and now it 
is not (or that object x is now there, and now object y is there). In most cases, the 
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belief that the object is now there is based on memory (since, in most cases, the object 
that is about to vanish is momentarily concealed from view). The belief that the object 
is now gone, however, is based on direct perception (of the absence of the object) 
(Smith, Dignum & Sonenberg, 2016). The experience depends on the contradiction 
between these two beliefs, but these beliefs are based on different psychological 
processes. 
 
The clash of expectations may be similar. The audience may expect that the object is 
about to ‘disappear’ (i.e. that, in a moment, it will not be there), because they 
understand that it is an illusion, but they cannot understand how, in the present 
conditions, it can be there one moment, and gone the next. The expectation that x will 
disappear, then, is based on an awareness of the wider context (that they are watching 
an illusion). The belief that x cannot disappear, however, is based on an awareness of 
the observable conditions (that, in these conditions, there is no imaginable way that it 
could disappear). The experience may involve both expectations because they are the 
result of different modes of processing, each concerned with a particular 
representational context. 
 
Third, this suggests that this experience may provide insights into the relationships 
between such processes. In doing so, however, it should be noted that there is more 
than one kind of magic effect, and that different effects may depend on different 
modes of processing. As noted above, many magic tricks produce a contradiction 
between a recent memory of a state of affairs and a perception of a different state of 
affairs. There are also many tricks (such as those in which a card is remembered, and 
later the magician reveals the name of the card), which create a belief that information 
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x cannot be known (based on logical reasoning about what has apparently happened) 
being followed by a perception that information x is known. In this case, there is also 
often an expectation that this will happen. However, some tricks produce the effect of 
an instantaneous change of an object, where the perception of x is immediately 
followed by the perception of y. In this case, one might expect ‘surprise’ in response 
to the sudden change. Other magical experiences, on the other hand, are prolonged, 
such as in the case of levitation, where an ongoing perception of x is accompanied by 
a logical reasoning that it cannot be. In this case, there may be an expectation of the 
event immediately prior to it happening, but the experience continues as a 
contradiction between what is being perceived (e.g. ‘he is in the air’) and what is 
thought possible (e.g. ‘but he has no support’). Thus, there may be different kinds of 
responses to magic tricks, which involve particular clashes of beliefs and 
expectations, each being based on different psychological processes.  
 
In terms of experimental studies, there are many possibilities. Tricks that involve a 
delay between the perception of x and the perception of y might explore the role of 
memory, by manipulating the length of the delay. Prolonged moments, such as 
levitation, would allow for participants to provide a form of feedback during the 
moment of seeming impossibility. In other cases, expectations could be manipulated 
by varying whether or not participants are aware that they are watching a magic trick, 
or are told precisely what is about to happen. In doing so, of course, one would need 
to bear in mind that even within a certain kind of effect (for example, a 
transformation), particular examples (for example, a vase becoming a rose, or a rose 
becoming a vase) may provoke different responses (Griffiths, 2015). To date, magic 
tricks have been used to explore a variety of cognitive processes. However, there is 
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ample scope to investigate further the emotional experience itself, and how it relates 





The experience of magic has been defined as the response to a seemingly impossible 
event that one understands to be an illusion. This experience, defined as such, has 
been around for millennia, and might be considered a particular kind of wonder. In 
certain respects, the experience has changed, as a result of a general rise in awareness 
of the kinds of techniques that magicians use. It has also taken a variety of forms, as a 
result of different effects and their dependence on various psychological processes. 
These can be seen as versions of this particular kind of wonder, any of which is a 
response to a particular event in a particular situation. 
 
There are, of course, other kinds of wonder, which can be provoked by different 
events, such as the beauty of a sunset, or a train that is unexpectedly late. These are 
clearly not the same as the kind of wonder that is being discussed here. One might, 
therefore, prefer the term ‘astonishment’ to refer to the experience of magic, 
providing that its relationship to ‘surprise’ (specifically, unexpectedness) is borne in 
mind. Whatever term is used, however, a more precise meaning of the experience can 
be gleaned from considering the kinds of events that provoke it. At the same time, the 
nature of the experience will be shaped not only by the event itself but also by context 
and meaning.  
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Consider, for example, the response to a seemingly impossible event that one does not 
understand to be an illusion. After all, for at least as long as magic tricks have been 
performed, there have been reports of various miraculous phenomena. Such events 
have been attributed to gods, priests, mediums and psychics. Depending on the 
individual and the cultural context, a ‘miracle’ might be experienced in a wide variety 
of ways, though in any given case, one might use the terms ‘wonder’ or 
‘astonishment’. How, then, does this compare to the experience of magic? 
 
On the one hand, the visual anomaly may be similar to that of a magic trick – for 
example, an object might appear from nowhere, transform into something else, or 
float in the air. On the other hand, a ‘miracle’ is not viewed as an illusion, but as a 
manifestation of the supernatural. One could not view such an event as a ‘miracle’ 
without quite different associations coming to mind, which relate to significantly 
deeper matters than what is being observed. This is the kind of wonder that Fuller 
(2006) has in mind when he argues that ‘the emotion of wonder elicits belief in the 
existence of a more-than-physical reality’ (p. 1). It is the kind of wonder that might be 
provoked by seeing a Marian apparition, perhaps, but not by seeing a stage magician 
make a rabbit appear from a hat. This is not just a matter of seeming impossibility, 
then, but of context and meaning. 
 
Thus, seemingly impossible events might provoke different kinds of wonder, but a 
meaningful distinction can be made between those that are understood to be illusions 
and those that are viewed as supernatural. In practice, such a distinction can be fuzzy, 
since ‘illusion’ and ‘supernatural’ are not the only available frames. For example, in 
recent years, there has been a significant rise in ‘psychological illusions’, which are 
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presented as if they are the result of ‘real’ psychological abilities. Nevertheless, it 
remains the case that there has been a remarkably longstanding and widespread kind 
of wonder provoked by seemingly impossible events that are understood to be 
illusions, because they have been performed in a social context in which this meaning 
has been made explicit. In such a context, where the audience understands that it is an 
illusion, the implications of the seemingly impossible event are limited, and do not 
elicit deeper thoughts and feelings of a spiritual nature. The experience of magic, 
then, might be seen as a form of astonishment that is bounded. 
 
This article has provided nothing more than a general survey across many centuries, 
and within somewhat limited geographical boundaries. The story, no doubt, is more 
complex. After all, what counts as ‘impossible’ depends on what, at any given time 
and place, one considers to be possible. Thus, magicians typically experience magic 
differently, because what may seem impossible to many does not seem so impossible 
to them (Danek et al, 2015). Nevertheless, magicians can still experience magic if, 
perhaps because they are not familiar with the particular method being used, they 
consider the effect to be impossible. What matters is that, regardless of the observer’s 
general beliefs about what is possible, the effect that occurs is, at that moment, 
thought to be impossible.  
 
Finally, while the experience happens in a particular moment, historical perspective 
remains essential to understanding how it comes about. After all, technological 
advances have made possible things that our ancestors would have considered 
magical, but that we now take for granted. Yet magicians have continued to astonish 
us, often by performing tricks that have been performed for centuries. They have 
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succeeded in this by constantly developing new physical and psychological methods, 
so that even traditional effects continue to seem impossible. In doing so, they have 
had to engage with public knowledge of certain methods (for example, by rolling up 
the sleeves, by having props inspected by the audience, or by passing a hoop around a 
floating person in order to ‘prove’ that s/he is not suspended by wires). They have 
also had to engage with public awareness of what is technologically possible, most 
obviously when magic came to be performed on radio, television and the internet.  
 
The experience of magic, then, depends on a constantly changing interaction between 
magicians and the public, in which the techniques of the former are based on the 
assumptions of the latter. In other words, while the experience of magic is clearly a 
mental phenomenon, it is also a social phenomenon, which needs to be understood as 
part of a complex form of interaction between humans who share particular 
assumptions within a specific socio-historical context. Thus, both experimental and 
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